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New Caledonia, a department of France located in the South Pacific, 
is one of the world’s key areas in terms of nickel and cobalt resources. 
Connected to both the territory’s colonialist past and the contemporary 
resource nationalism of its indigenous Melanesian Kanak population, 
nickel mining is the country’s principal industry, and the territory is esti-
mated to hold one of the world’s largest reserves of the metal (usgs 2014). 
Meanwhile, in the political sphere, a referendum on the territory’s inde-
pendence must be held by 2018, representing the culmination of a long 
process of decolonization, and pressure on both sides is high. My aim in 
the discussion presented here is to explore the conjuncture of these two 
elements: to examine and challenge the idea of “development” that is tied 
to large-scale capitalist mining projects in New Caledonia, taking into 
account its settler history, its incarnation as a modern neoliberal and ter-
ritorial state, Kanak sovereignty claims, and Kanak expectations for the 
future. Involvement with the mining industry has been a way for Kanak 
to strive for recognition and sovereignty in relation to the Western world; 
consequently, a central question also to be examined is the degree to which 
the industry actually enables these goals for the colonized population and 
the kinds of futures they materialize. It should be noted that this essay is 
intended as a critical “thought-piece,” offering a frame for further inves-
tigation rather than a definitive analysis of either mining or independence 
struggles in the country.
The principal focus of discussion lies on two different examples of 
nickel production in New Caledonia: the Koniambo nickel refinery proj-
ect in the largely Kanak North Province, and Goro in the more European 
South Province. Koniambo was originally established in response to Kanak 
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nationalist calls for independent economic development in the north and 
is expected to reach its full capacity by 2016, becoming one of the world’s 
leading nickel producers. On the other hand, since its inception, the Goro 
nickel project—largely owned by Brazil’s Vale New Caledonia (henceforth 
vnc)—has been seen as a risky project by a broadening base of south-
ern communities operating under a Kanak-led umbrella organization, the 
Comité Consultatif Coutumier Environnemental (ccce). 
While both the Koniambo and Vale mining projects are embedded in the 
state’s territorializing projects, they appear to incorporate different aspira-
tions and imaginaries for Kanak sovereignty and identity: the Koniambo 
refinery supports those of an independent future for Kanak and recogni-
tion of their economic power and sovereignty in relation to France and the 
outside world, while the Goro project continues to strengthen French con-
trol. The pact of corporate social responsibility for development that has 
been signed with representatives of local communities (discussed below) 
merely directs attention away from the socially and economically unequal 
position of Kanak in New Caledonia, particularly in the south, in rela-
tion to the white settler population. On the other hand, both projects 
equally represent the ambivalent nature of global capitalism, as neither 
acknowledges the fragility of developmental expectations that are tied to 
large-scale resource extraction. Ultimately, the aspirations for territory, 
freedom, and identity recognition of peoples who live in subordinating 
systems of state power and global economic hierarchies are of little inter-
est to companies engaged in resource extraction, even if outwardly ame-
liorated by expectations such as those attached to Koniambo or to vnc’s 
“development pact.” 
As noted by James Ferguson (1994, 256), a discourse of independence 
that is synonymous with freedom and empowerment may actually work 
as what he has termed an “anti-politics machine” to localize and depoliti-
cize understandings of the roots of global inequality and poverty. Politi-
cally marginalized people in territories that are rich in natural resources, 
locked into a global capitalist system based on economic hierarchy and 
exploitation, face considerable barriers to empowerment, independence 
notwithstanding. Ferguson has further argued that there is, moreover, no 
such thing as a truly sovereign, independent national economy but, rather, 
an order of nations that regularly leaves exploited regions to manage their 
problems alone (2006). Finally, linking development and a nation’s inde-
pendence expectations to large mining projects may allow poverty and 
inequality to linger on even after independence has been achieved. In New 
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Caledonia, both the Koniambo and Vale projects work like anti-politics 
machines: the singular focus on mining in the local discourses of future 
development and sovereignty directs attention away from the long-term 
questions of building the nation and developing a viable economy and a 
just society after colonialism. On the other hand, Koniambo might also 
prove a truly emancipating project providing room and hope for alterna-
tive futures. It is too early to say.
Data for this essay were drawn from in-depth interviews I conducted in 
New Caledonia in November and December 2014 and from select second-
ary literature. My main informants were Kanak people working as part 
of vnc’s pact in the South Province and representatives of the southern 
communities; environmental organizations; the Department of Industry, 
Mines, and Energy (dimenc); and the Bureau of Rural Development and 
Land Ownership (adraf). Visits were also made to the town of Koné in 
North Province where the Koniambo factory is situated. 
Imagining a Nation in a Territorial State
France colonized New Caledonia in 1853, and the country now has 
approximately 260,000 inhabitants (isee 2014). According to the lat-
est estimations of ethnic origin, about 40 percent belong to the country’s 
indigenous Melanesian Kanak population, 30 percent to the European set-
tler population, and the rest are of Polynesian and Southeast Asian descent 
(isee 2009). Following Benedict Anderson (1991), the nation can be con-
ceptualized as an imagined political community, one visualized as hori-
zontal and communal by those who may never meet each other but are 
still willing to die for the idea. Further to this, Robert Foster, in his work 
on Melanesia and Papua New Guinea (2002), has noted how nation mak-
ing and a nation’s “materialization” may take place at the most mundane 
levels of everyday social life, in conjunction with new media technologies 
and consumer goods and therefore with the collusion of global capitalism. 
In the course of this, however, the nation—the politically and globally 
dominant form of community—translates the claims of subaltern identi-
ties into the hegemonic language, simultaneously limiting any possibilities 
for alternative perspectives (Foster 2002). Thus, articulating and imagin-
ing a Kanak identity has been an important element in the slow, postcolo-
nial, state-making process of New Caledonia, although the imaginary of a 
Kanak nation has, in recent years, mostly been enabled by its conjuncture 
with the mining industry.
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The term “Kanak” as a designation was born in the anticolonialist pro-
tests of the 1970s and was clearly articulated and defined by, for example, 
the Kanak leader of the independence movement, Jean-Marie Tjibaou 
(Fisher 2014; Chappell 2013). As Tanya Murray Li argued (2000), notions 
such as “indigenous” are positionings that emerge from history and from 
patterns of engagement and struggle rather than being natural or simply 
invented identifications. Thus references such as “the Kanak” and also 
the idea of a unitary Kanak state with a solid national framework and 
a common interest override the diversity of chiefdoms, clans, territories, 
and languages that make up the actual reality (Bensa and Wittersheim 
1998). Thus the indigeneity of the Kanak resonates with the formulations 
of Alex Golub in his 2014 examination of relations between an abstract 
aggregate of indigenous PNG people and a local mining corporation. 
Golub referred to both as “leviathans,” an Old Testament term selected in 
 recognition of the power and agency that local aggregates aspire to and of 
the  antiquity of the kind of entity that the people and the mine he studies 
hope to become: “social persons, social totalities, macro actors, mass col-
lectivities, and so forth” (2014, 4). In Golub’s terminology, therefore, the 
notion of the leviathan is a totalizing concept, which he also described as 
a “remarkable semiotic accomplishment” (2014, 7), for collective entities 
that on closer examination may be seen as less coherent than they appear 
and rather composed of multiple actors with diverse interests. Indeed, in a 
scenario that resonates with vnc’s endorsement of the sustainable devel-
opment pact, Golub specifically noted the phenomenon whereby a corpo-
ration, which clearly lacks hands, may “sign” an agreement (2014, 28).
The violent civil war between the anticolonialist Kanak and French 
 loyalists in the 1980s in New Caledonia made possible the idea of a politi-
cal referendum, and an image of an independent nation for the Kanak, 
in a series of agreements. The Matignon-Oudinot Accords of 1988, fol-
lowed by the Nouméa Accord in 1998, introduced the process of negoti-
ated decolonization to the region (Le Meur and others 2013), and the lat-
ter agreement also guaranteed that a referendum would be held between 
2014 and 2018. But imagining a nation and establishing a break with 
the colonialist past require internal and external recognition. As Dani-
lyn Rutherford has argued (2008), while nationalism is performative, a 
nation comes into existence only when its members can imagine them-
selves being recognizable to others and when it receives recognition from 
an extranational point of view. As has already been suggested, the mining 
industry, by virtue of its revenue generation and global connections, has 
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been an important factor in Kanak nation building. Conversely, the articu-
lation of a coherent Kanak identity that is also recognizable to the outside 
world has provided opportunities for Kanak to claim rights over mineral 
resources in the North Province. 
Foster noted that, in Papua New Guinea, the spread of commodity con-
sumption has introduced the notion that such goods can “belong to every-
one,” as they can be consumed regardless of social relations and indig-
enous exchange practices (2002). Similarly, in New Caledonia, Koniambo 
“belongs to everyone” in the imaginaries of a Kanak nation and identity. 
It is a project that looks to a future independent of France but one exhib-
iting transformed understandings of relationships with land—customar-
ily based on reciprocity rather than individual landownership (Robbins 
2006; Kirsch 2006; West 2006a, 2006b; Wood 2004): therefore, gaining 
recognition from the wider and white political world might involve the 
destruction of indigenous cosmology (Robbins 2006). As Michael Wood 
wrote (2004), in the Melanesian gift economy, people and things exist in a 
world of personal relations with places that provide fundamentally impor-
tant ways of understanding existence as well as past, present, and future. 
When places change because of large-scale resource extraction, and disas-
ters caused by these projects follow, people experience a profound loss of 
social relations, identities, and the past tied to those places (Kirsch 2006). 
On the other hand, Michael Scott has observed that among the Arosi in 
Solomon Islands, traditional understanding of territories and ancestral 
relationships to land continue to thrive in overlapping, contradictory, and 
fluid postcolonial contexts (2007). Various Melanesian state-making pro-
cesses are thus marked by the creation of agency in a global context, by 
the creation of dual identity-building projects, and by transformations in 
order to garner outside recognition (Foster 2002).
Nonetheless, in what Karl Polanyi referred to as the creation of ficti-
tious commodities (1944), when land is titled and labeled and when the 
territorializing power has the ability to draw boundaries around objects, 
people, and resources, the logic of land as a market-goods-producing com-
modity becomes normalized, and this single model inevitably becomes 
hegemonic (Peluso and Lund 2011). When the state classifies rural space 
and its populations into “tribal slots,” it typically results in the people 
becoming marginalized groups, while the resources of the locale are ter-
ritorialized (Li 2000). Peter Vandergeest and Nancy Peluso observed that 
such territorialization is all about “excluding or including people within 
particular territorial boundaries and about controlling what people do and 
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their access to natural resources within those boundaries” (1995, 388), 
concluding that territorial land-use planning is unachievable and utopian 
in that it ignores and contradicts indigenous lived histories and social rela-
tionships with land. Thus a state’s territorializing processes and resulting 
definitions of boundaries and calculable natural resources contradict the 
notion of territory as something that Arturo Escobar described as a rela-
tional and experienced, cosmological, and identity-building “place” for 
the people living there (2008, 42).
In New Caledonia, the state has remained a territorializing power 
throughout colonization and decolonization, and the social and eco-
nomic inequality thus produced is reflected in the geographical segrega-
tion between Kanak and settlers in the region. The decolonizing Matignon 
Accords of 1988 divided the territory into three provinces: the North and 
South Provinces on the main island, and the Loyalty Islands, which lie 
to the east. France granted further autonomy to the three provinces in 
the Nouméa Accords in 1998. Frustrations and tensions remain, however, 
as the accords have not resolved critical social and economic problems, 
and the Kanak population still does not participate as equals in the terri-
tory (Connell 2003). Commercial and bureaucratic power resides in the 
south, mostly in the hands of the Europeans, while the more peripheric, 
Kanak-populated North Province and Loyalty Islands have been denied 
economic development. Meanwhile, analyses indicate that the Matignon 
and Nouméa Accords have actually delayed the independence referendum 
and fragmented what was once a strong independence movement (Fisher 
2014; Connell 2003). Melanesian nationalists have accused France of 
using the delay and concurrent developments in migration as a means of 
keeping Melanesians in a minority and polarizing society with an influx of 
metropolitan French (Blay 1988; Connell 2003). 
Thus recent trends have continued to support economic and social 
polarization and deprivation of ancestral lands, which was formalized in 
1887 when the Code de l’Indigénat introduced closely regulated move-
ment out of native reserve areas and exerted control within them. It also 
forbade Kanak entry to the capital city of Nouméa, situated in the South 
Province of the main island, and allowed nearly 90 percent of the land 
to be transferred to colonialists and the administration, to be used for 
economic or military ends (Bensa and Wittersheim 1998). It was not until 
1946 that France granted citizenship to Kanak as part of global decol-
onization plans and the Code de l’Indigénat was abolished, although, 
unlike in many African French colonies, this did not lead to independence. 
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Rather, as part of the decolonization process, land was gradually clas-
sified as public, private, or “customary,” with adraf being established 
by the Matignon Accords (Bouard 2013). Answering to land-title claims 
made by groups such as families, clans, clan groups, or tribes who claim 
to be its original owners, adraf buys land and distributes it back to the 
groups as “customary land”; between 1978 and 2013 the percentage of 
customary lands on the main island increased from 9 percent to 17 percent 
(adraf 2013). 
Elsewhere in Melanesia, the concept of “customary landowners” is 
problematic. For example, clans in Papua New Guinea have become land-
owners only during the course of the last ten years as a result of recent min-
eral exploitation (Filer 1997), although Golub suggested that Papua New 
Guinea’s “landowning group” is a myth that serves the national patrimony 
because “traditional Melanesian culture,” envisaged as ancient, unchang-
ing, and peaceful, is regarded by metropolitans as a good basis for land 
registration (2014, 176). In New Caledonia, the category of customary 
land also serves a system of state territoriality, placing Kanak in a differ-
ent economic position in relation to settlers because customary lands are 
not granted the same development opportunities as public or private lands 
since they are inalienable: they cannot be sold and their ownership may 
not be transferred. Furthermore, the customary land category reinforces 
understandings of North Province as “Kanak land” because the major 
proportion is found there, while the south and the capital have economi-
cally and administratively remained in the hands of the settlers. Thus state 
territoriality in New Caledonia has produced geographically based social 
and economic difference between Kanak and the French settlers in vari-
ous ways—initially through land dispossession and then, in the process of 
decolonization, through the provincial divide and adraf-managed land 
classification and distribution. This naturalization of the top-down-man-
aged “customary” category, together with neoliberal state policies wherein 
no functional regulative framework for private companies exists, is favor-
able to mining companies that can negotiate with communities privately 
and do not have to be held environmentally or socially responsible for 
the wider society. Multinational mining projects are both shaped by local 
forms of governance and shape the state-building processes of the countries 
where they operate (Le Meur and others 2013). Thus the two mining proj-
ects discussed in this essay both manifest the polarized society of Kanak 
and settlers in the area and comprise the conjuncture of local politics and 
mining projects that almost certainly will shape the future of the nation.
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Mining Industry in a Neoliberal State
The roots of the state-supported capitalist mining industry lie far back in 
New Caledonian colonialist history and in the state’s territorial control. 
Private companies, comprising an elite economic power, were part of the 
administration and expansion of European colonies in which, in general, 
native populations were separated from colonial economic growth and 
colonial sovereignty was outsourced to small elites of plantation own-
ers (Hansen and Stepputat 2006). European stock farmers and coffee 
planters, for example, were important factors influencing New Caledo-
nian settlement and land demarcations: Planters had sovereign rights over 
their land as individual owners, in contrast to Melanesians, who were not 
considered capable of developing land on an individual basis (Doumenge 
1998). Since its instigation in 1874, the mining industry has relied on 
more than a hundred years of legislative support from the French gov-
ernment. The penal colony population and the imported workforce, who 
worked in slave-like conditions under collective contracts, were initially 
in the service of the industry (Bencivengo 2014), while New Caledonia’s 
leading European families, who dominate the overall economy and have 
great political power, owe much of their wealth to involvement in nickel 
mining. Since the Matignon and Nouméa Accords, the three provinces 
have had autonomy over the management of their economies and natural 
resources, but the French state still gets revenue from them and, in return, 
supports the industry financially when mining activity is slow or provides 
tax relief (Le Meur, Horowitz, and Mennesson 2013). 
New Caledonia’s mining could be analyzed from the “resource curse” 
perspective (Auty 1993), and certainly aspects of the condition as it is 
broadly understood are apparent in the territory. Proponents of the con-
cept often focus on economic and political factors such as the mismanage-
ment or distortion of the economy caused by mineral dependency and the 
intensification of conflict between the competing actors that may result 
(Ballard and Banks 2003); long-term environmental damage (Filer and 
Macintyre 2006); and, in cultural terms, the development of unrealistic 
hopes and expectations among people who do not derive any benefit from 
resource extraction. However, while all these features are clearly present 
in New Caledonia, the perspective masks the heterogenic historical and 
national trajectories of the mining industry that have been nurtured by 
the territory’s neoliberal political climate (Le Meur and Banaré 2014). 
Neoliberalism can be characterized by strong private property rights, free 
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market, and free trade; and where a market does not exist—as is the case 
with traditional land use, water, or social security—one is created (Har-
vey 2006). Central to neoliberalization is the “spatial fix”: a means for 
capitalism to solve its crises by expanding into new territories (Harvey 
2001). Capitalist expansion also requires the re-creation of nature as the 
biophysical world increasingly enters the sphere of capitalist accumula-
tion, while, as a general rule, the neoliberal state does not interfere when 
problems result but rather encourages its citizens to take communal or 
personal responsibility (Castree 2008). It should be noted, however, that, 
following James Ferguson (2010), neoliberalism as such is not an auto-
matic evil; it is how it is applied that makes the difference. Neoliberalism 
can also be an “art of governance” that may be put to use in reducing 
poverty. 
The multinational mining industry is driven by and connected to flows 
of international finance, but two different political circumstances char-
acterize the mining corporation–government–citizen nexuses of the two 
provinces (Le Meur and others 2013). In the north, the mining enclave is 
the product of the province’s partnership with the private sector, whereas 
in the south, the setting is one of conflict and agreement between the 
community and the mining corporation (Le Meur and others 2013). In 
both cases, however, the context is one of state neoliberalization, espe-
cially marked by outsourcing the development of society and its well-
being to private mining companies. During the period of decolonization, 
New Caledonia has become a territory where the extraction of mineral 
resources by private companies has left no room for environmental or 
social concern but rather has been considered the most effective means 
to promote development and employment. Certainly, it must be said that 
many Kanak have found employment through the Koniambo project and 
thirty further mine sites, of which some are locally owned and some are 
owned by multinational companies (Horowitz 2015). 
The New Caledonian Mining Code, adopted in 2009, is a scheme gov-
erning all mining industry in the country that concerns nickel, chrome, 
and cobalt. One feature of the code is that of “mine police,” explained to 
me by a dimenc official as an institution responsible for the environmen-
tal surveillance of the mining projects. But, the official added, the proj-
ects are controlled by the provinces, which independently have general 
authority over all environmental matters. Mining is poorly managed, and 
the consequences have been devastating for New Caledonia’s ecosystems: 
Erosion on the mountains, sedimentation on the coasts, and heavy metal 
dialogue • lassila 393
pollution in potable water supplies and lagoons are only some of the nega-
tive impacts (Ali and Grewal 2006). 
The anticolonial and pro-independence movements in the 1970s listed 
resource sovereignty and mining reform among their objectives (Horowitz 
2010), influencing the development of the nickel industry in the north 
with its high number of customary land areas and majority Kanak popu-
lation. Through transfers of title between French-owned nickel producer 
Société Le Nickel (sln) and Société Minière du Sud Pacifique (smsp), 
which is owned by the North Province, the nickel-rich Koniambo massif 
was shifted to the ownership of smsp and Canadian Falconbridge (now 
Glencore Xstrata), which financed the bulk of the project costs while 
smsp remained the majority owner with 51 percent (Bouard 2013; Con-
nell 2003). Construction began on the project in 2007, and production 
was officially inaugurated in 2014, using a low-cost pyrometallurgical 
process to produce ferronickel taken from its open-pit mine. The goal is 
to produce 60,000 tonnes of ferronickel yearly over twenty-five years of 
mine life, although production targets have not yet been met. The trans-
fer of Koniambo ownership to the North Province is the embodiment of 
great hopes for Kanak as it is a highly politicized project with nationalistic 
vision; the possibilities of economic self-sufficiency that it offers are neces-
sary for autonomy, since it is expected to contribute to the territory’s long-
term economic development and employment (Horowitz 2004). 
In 1999, the Canadian mining company Inco completed a pilot nickel 
refinery located at the southern tip of the main island. It was bought by 
Brazilian cvrd (Companhia Vale do Rio Doce; later renamed Vale) in 
2006 and should have reached its full capacity in 2015 (Horowitz 2015). 
Vale’s refinery, which is equal in size to Koniambo, uses a hydrometallur-
gical acid leaching process due to the ore’s low mineral content, a process 
dangerous to the environment because there is a risk of toxic chemicals 
and heavy metals entering the rivers and the lagoon; the effluent is released 
into the ocean through a submarine pipe, and tailings are disposed of 
on dry land (Ali and Grewal 2006). From the beginning, the project was 
resisted by neighboring Kanak communities and environmental organi-
zations even though not strictly rejected by Kanak chiefs because of its 
employment prospects (Ali and Grewal 2006; Horowitz 2015). However, 
neither the construction of the project nor the refinery itself has employed 
many of the local Kanak population.
As very few Kanak are in governmental or influential positions, they have 
had little power to influence the project’s development from its inception. 
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Work on the mine site was already underway while Kanak in the Goro 
area—worried that it would threaten their subsistence and livelihoods, as 
well as their traditional fishing and hunting grounds—were still search-
ing for experts to provide an independent analysis of its expected impacts 
(Ali and Grewal 2006). Between 2009 and 2014 environmental incidents 
took place almost yearly, the latest in May 2014 when, due to human 
error, over 90,000 liters of acidic effluent leaked into a creek, killing fish 
in great numbers, polluting the environment, and finally flowing to the 
lagoon and fishing grounds. In the early years of the refinery, local Kanak 
resistance to it coalesced into an association called Rhéébù Nùù, the first 
environmental social movement in New Caledonia. It distributed pam-
phlets, organized public meetings, sent letters, and attracted support from 
similar indigenous environmental movements abroad (Horowitz 2010). 
In 2004 it turned to more radical strategies, instigating violent protests, 
destruction of equipment and blockades, and finally a short suspension of 
factory operations in 2006 (Horowitz 2015). However, on 27 September 
2008, when Vale had already bought the refinery from Inco, the Pact for 
the Sustainable Development of the South was signed in the town of Yaté 
between Vale Inco, the Customary Council of Djubéa Kaponé, Rhéébù 
Nùù, and the Customary Senat. There would be no more violent protests, 
and in turn the corporation would finance social and environmental devel-
opment of affected communities for thirty years through the Corporation 
Foundation (later renamed the Vale Foundation). The Comité Consultatif 
Coutumier Environnemental (ccce) was also created to be responsible for 
the surveillance of the corporation’s environmental impact. During the 
timeline, the corporation would, for example, replant trees in the zones 
affected by mining, build a visitor center, hire environmental technicians 
for the ccce, and create nursery gardens (Vale Inco 2008).
The pact is based on the premises of the decolonizing Nouméa Accords 
(which underline the importance of traditional indigenous culture) and 
on the premises of “sustainable development” from the 1992 Rio sum-
mit (Vale Inco 2008, article 1). Although never explicitly titled as such by 
the corporation, the Vale pact is an Impact and Benefit Agreement (ibe) 
belonging to the tools and strategies of corporate social responsibility (csr) 
(Le Meur, Horowitz, and Mennesson 2013). This is a concept described by 
Marina Welker as being created in answer to the questions asked by trans-
national social movements of the 1990s about the undemocratic activities 
of corporations and international institutions: csr “seizes the movement” 
before it seizes control over the corporation (Welker 2009). Voluntary 
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self-regulation, audit culture, and the importance of keeping business as 
a priority and maximizing profit rather than prioritizing ethical consider-
ations are typical of csr practices. Even though the state is absent from 
these agreements with communities, through csr strategies, corporations 
become a state-like presence in remote areas by building infrastructure or 
providing education and community programs (Welker 2009).
“We Did Not Need Another Factory in the South”
The social development that Vale has brought to the South Province is 
questionable: employment figures for the Kanak population are low, and 
ecologically damaging accidents continue. As the financial interests of 
the South Province’s governmental regulators are vested in vnc’s project, 
dimenc—a governmental institution—has not put efficient pressure on 
the province to negatively sanction the company. While the South Prov-
ince owns only a small part of the company, it was the French state that 
originally convinced Inco to invest in New Caledonia, with a tax exemp-
tion plan involving us$100 million worth of savings (Horowitz 2015, 93). 
In November and December 2014, some of those Kanak who, through 
the structures of the Vale Foundation and the ccce, are responsible for the 
surveillance and implementation of the Vale Pact discussed Vale’s Goro 
project with me for the purpose of this essay. It soon became clear that 
the Kanak pact supervisors face a dilemma with regard to the corporation 
that employs them, as the contract has not brought the sustainable social 
and environmental development that was promised. One informant, who 
had formerly been an activist and a Rhéébù Nùù member and is now 
a Vale Foundation representative, observed in an interview: “We have 
always been against the project.” It seemed that by “we” he meant both 
himself and other Kanak who had agreed, on the basis of the pact, to work 
on the mining corporation’s terms and abandon protests. He said that the 
refinery of the north was a much-needed project for the rebalancing of 
the country but added, “We did not need another factory in the south”—
meaning that as there is already a French-owned refinery in Nouméa 
(Eramet’s Doniambo plant), another under non-Kanak ownership would 
produce economic and social imbalance. When asked about the contract’s 
current influence on surrounding communities, a representative of ccce 
answered that “the pact is for thirty years but it will not last that long,” 
implying that the environment would be ruined long before that. Thus the 
views of Kanak representatives of both the Vale Foundation and the ccce 
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supported each other; it seemed clear, in conversation with these infor-
mants, that they felt they needed to express the resentment they currently 
felt toward the nickel factory.
Between the last incident of acidic effluent pollution (in May 2014) 
and November 2014, representatives of the Vale Foundation, the ccce, 
chiefs of nearby communities, and other actors had over sixty meetings, 
making over one hundred recommendations, most of which have still been 
left unanswered by the corporation. When asked about the relationship 
that Vale Foundation and the ccce presently have with the corporation, 
my informants answered that there are “problems of articulation,” add-
ing that they are starting to get the feeling that the corporation’s attitude 
toward the Kanak supervisors of the pact is “insulting.” Finally, there was 
an outburst of frustration about the fact that it is impossible to close the 
factory, that there is no trust left, and that there is “nothing that can be 
done” about the situation.
When asked about the possible developmental impacts that the pact has 
had on communities, the ccce representative replied: “Vale finances a cer-
tain well-being, but can it really be described as such?” He was referring 
to the financing of school canteens, the building of tribal storage houses 
and libraries, and publication of educational and promotional leaflets and 
other materials. He explained how, beyond the structures of the contract 
and bypassing traditional Kanak hierarchies, the corporation also gives 
“individual money” to people in various positions in the clans and vil-
lages. It seems that the corporation’s pact has encouraged what Peter Ben-
son and Stuart Kirsch called the “politics of resignation,” which hinders 
the possibilities for radical protest and change (2010, 466). When cor-
porations connected to potentially damaging industries shift their strate-
gies from rejection of criticism to engagement, their tactics often lead to 
feelings of disempowerment and frustration in the social worlds in which 
they function: the critics’ ability and motivation to bring about radical 
restructuring and change is reduced when corporations actively engage 
with them and assimilate them into corporate structures by forming part-
nerships or recruiting activists to join boards of directors or work as pub-
lic relations advisors (Benson and Kirsch 2010, 466). 
It is here that Ferguson’s concept of anti-politics in terms of mining 
development becomes central. vnc has not been able to provide the 
“development” that was promised in the pact, at least not in the ways that 
local Kanak expected. The Kanak’s historically produced, socially and 
economically inferior position has merely been depoliticized and reduced 
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to a pact without taking into any account their political or socioeconomic 
role or their limited access to land more broadly. On the contrary, the pact 
by its very existence suspends any kind of political discourse. Keeping in 
mind that the vnc nickel project is entangled with the political and finan-
cial interests of the south’s white ruling elite, the corporate appropriation 
of Kanak resistance has led to a situation in which development promised 
in the pact seems to be working precisely like Ferguson’s “anti-politics 
machine” (2006, 280), treating political questions of land, resources, jobs, 
and wages as technical problems and transferring the power of the state 
to the corporation.
Corporate strategies that are supported by neoliberalist state policies 
but that are in strict contradiction with the social world and the territorial 
relationships of local people have, as Horowitz pointed out (2015), been 
“culturally articulated” and legitimated in the pact. vnc’s corporate social 
responsibility strategies have appropriated resistance and both the state’s 
formal and protestors’ informal powers of regulation. The representatives 
of the Vale Foundation and the ccce are in ambiguous positions: in the 
past they resisted the corporation, but now they engage actively with it 
on an almost daily basis. While they might not previously have held high 
positions in the traditional hierarchies, they now speak for their commu-
nities, and while they claim they are proud of a pact that benefits their 
communities’ development, in the same breath they express their disap-
pointment about the corporation’s subsequent actions.
The ambiguous positions of these informants are comparable to those 
of Alex Golub’s “spokesmen” for his leviathans (2014, 19). Given that 
an abstract entity such as a mining corporation has agents to represent 
it, indigenous people must also become a corporate group that can be 
similarly represented in order for both the mine and people to be feasible 
as interlocutors. Thus southern Kanak affected by vnc are articulated in 
the Vale Pact as “stakeholders” (parties prenantes) that have a special 
“historical, mythical and cultural relationship to land” (Vale Inco 2008, 
article 1). It is, however, unclear who represents whom: whether the indig-
enous representatives really represent the indigenous people or the mine 
or are merely acting in their own self-interest (Golub 2014, 28). Indeed, in 
answer to my further inquiries into the foundations of negative develop-
ments, one representative from the ccce observed that “it is all politics.” 
He then went on to talk about his tribe’s customary land. Pointing out 
the window to some houses on a nearby hill in the Nouméa suburb where 
we were conducting the interview, he said: “There is my tribe. There are 
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all those foreign influences, but we have always resisted.” Taking a piece 
of paper, he drew a circle in the middle, surrounded it with some smaller 
circles, and said: “That is us, and all these around us, they are foreign-
ers.” The vnc problem is clearly a continuation of the state’s policies of 
territorialization and neoliberalization whereby Melanesian land has been 
reclassified according to Western assumptions of landownership. Kanak 
representatives in the south also understand vnc and the pact to be an 
ongoing part of the history of dispossession, territorialization, and colo-
nialist divide whereby Kanak have been isolated and treated as strangers 
in their own land. Yet the space for Kanak in New Caledonia is small in 
terms of political or economic power, and it is only by appropriating West-
ern concepts of landownership that the Kanak have recently been able to 
acquire financial clout. It could be said that Koniambo in the north repre-
sents a culmination of the logic of Kanak capitalist land development and 
growing economic and collective power.
Koniambo Strengthens Sovereignty
Koniambo has been supported by France and French loyalists as a peace-
maintenance project because of its balancing influence (Horowitz 2010). 
For the same reason, questions arise as to whether it advances or delays 
independence and the extent to which it works for the benefit of indig-
enous sovereignty (Horowitz 2004). Undeniably, a focus on economic 
development requires financial assistance from France, which in turn 
invokes political dependency. In settler states, the position of colonized 
populations is contradictory in terms of economic and political power 
(Cattelino 2010); indigenous people require economic resources to exer-
cise sovereignty, and often their revenues are based on their governmental 
rights as indigenous citizens. However, increasing wealth on the part of 
the colonized population is understood in the wider society, in law, in 
public culture, and in interaction as individualized economic and political 
assimilation to the settler population (Cattelino 2010). Indigenous eco-
nomic development and indigenous sovereignty development thus easily 
negate one another.
Sonia Grochain, David Poithily, and Jean-Michele Sourisseau noted 
that it is still difficult to define objectively the social and economic impacts 
of large-scale mineral exploitation in the North Province and that uncer-
tainty remains among the people in the province concerning Koniambo’s 
impacts on the Kanak’s social organization and economy as well as the 
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natural environment (2012). While the mine has employed local Kanak, 
including youth, the employment of Kanak women remains marginal. As 
large-scale resource extraction is dominated by distant capital and respon-
sive to fluctuating international markets (Kirsch 2014), the reliability of 
Koniambo in terms of market risks may be questioned. Furthermore, con-
cerns have been expressed that Koniambo’s huge infrastructure will have 
a destructive impact on the environment, including local rivers and marine 
ecosystems (Ali and Grewal 2006). The factory’s coal-fueled power plant 
will also be a massive fossil-fuel polluter, and the overall emissions of 
the complex will be higher than those of Goro (Ali and Grewal 2006). 
 Matthias Kowasch noted that because of the growing mineral industry 
in the whole New Caledonia region, attention to environmental details 
and local environmental surveillance has recently gained more ground 
(2012), and in 2006 a committee consisting of local customary authorities 
(djelawe) was established to survey Koniambo’s environmental impacts. 
Even though the Koniambo complex was established on the basis of 
political aspirations, to what extent is it possible to lean on an industrial 
project for stable rebalancing of power asymmetries? After all, the proj-
ect is a joint venture with a multinational corporation that is seeking to 
maximize its profit, and that lies outside the political and regional frame-
work of the Kanak independence question. It is claimed that the mine’s 
life will extend to twenty-five years, but in terms of long-term regional 
development, this does not provide much of a future. What will happen 
to employment prospects, for example, after the ore has been exhausted? 
Furthermore, currently there is only Koniambo to muster aspirations for 
financial independence that might advance political independence from 
France. There are still two massive French and Brazilian nickel refineries 
in the south, along with numerous smaller mining projects that do not 
have a political background of promoting Kanak independence. 
Nonetheless, the Koniambo refinery symbolically strengthens a model 
of Kanak sovereignty that has been historically imagined and constructed 
and creatively articulated. Koniambo can be understood to exist in the 
framework of what Partha Chatterjee described as nationalism’s “inner” 
and “material” domains, connecting more spiritual nationalist aspirations 
with material means (1996). Anticolonialist nationalism likewise creates 
its own domain of sovereignty within colonial society by dividing the world 
into the material and the spiritual: The material incorporates the economy, 
statecraft, and technology, areas in which the colonial government has 
proven its superiority; on the other hand, the spiritual, “inner” domain 
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that essentializes cultural identity and from which the colonial state is 
excluded is even more important. Through the inner domain, nationalism 
fashions a “modern” national culture that demarcates it from the West, 
one in which the nation is already brought into being as sovereign even if 
the colonial power still governs the state (Chatterjee 1996).
It must be kept in mind that Kanak definitions of identity and anticolo-
nialist nationalism have developed in the context of French colonization 
(Fisher 2014). As Tanya Murray Li wrote, “Every articulation is a creative 
act” (2000, 169), but it is also structured through previous engagements. 
The ways in which Kanak identity came to be imagined and articulated 
were also influenced, among other factors, by individuals such as Jean-
Marie Tjibaou, assassinated in 1989 by a radical independence activist. 
Tjibaou started the modern Kanak independence movement and was 
the first leader of the independence party Front de Libération Nationale 
Kanak et Socialiste (flnks). He imagined a Kanak modernity that would 
involve the emergence of a new Kanak who was distinctively Melanesian 
but simultaneously universal (Bensa and Wittersheim 1998). “A return to 
tradition is a myth. For me, the model, the search for an identity is ahead 
of oneself, never behind. . . . Our identity is ahead of us,” Tjibaou stated 
in a March 1985 interview in the French journal Les Temps Modernes 
(quoted in Tjibaou 1996, 155). According to Tjibaou, sovereignty meant 
interdependence but also the right to choose one’s partners (Bensa and 
Wittersheim 1998). 
Tjibaou’s nationalism was fueled by ethnological definitions and his 
experiences as a student in France and as a Catholic priest; he saw taking 
over the mines as only one route to economic independence, even though 
that was the path chosen by independence leaders who followed in his 
wake (Bensa and Wittersheim 1998). Kanak resource nationalism based 
on mineral wealth that influenced the development of the Koniambo mas-
sif in the 1990s also grew from Tjibaou’s clearly articulated thoughts of 
a Kanak identity with Western attributes and an imagined future. Foster 
has further suggested that globalization has expanded horizons for Mela-
nesian people and Pacific Islanders and oriented them toward membership 
in an enlarged world, though he also noted that while globalization may 
be used to assert connectivity to imagined, global communities such as a 
“nation,” these assertions are also somewhat bound up with the colonial 
contexts from which they emerge (2002, 133–134). Koniambo is a mate-
rialization of both the spiritual search for sovereignty and the generation 
of global connectivity through the means that are at hand in the specific 
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historical and political situation. With its offshore factory ready in South 
Korea and the concrete possibilities of employment that it offers, it might 
lead the way for wider social and economic development for Kanak in the 
whole of New Caledonia.
Mining Development and Different Futures
Kanak attach different futures to Koniambo and to vnc: those in the south 
in particular lean on articulations of a unifying Kanak indigeneity in their 
opposition to vnc and in claims that “we did not need another factory 
in the south,” as if they feel a sense of ownership for Koniambo in the 
north. Following Rutherford (2008), these articulations are also meant 
for outsiders and are part of an anticolonialist nationalism that is in the 
process of imagining a collectivity that may be recognized from the out-
side. Koniambo has, therefore, been a means to enact Kanak sovereignty. 
With the support of clearly articulated definitions of a coherent Kanak 
identity in history, such as those formulated by Tjibaou, it has been pos-
sible for Kanak to establish anticolonialist nationalism and a vision of 
independence by claiming ownership over distinctively Kanak land and its 
economic resources in the North Province. The state’s territorializing pro-
cesses have thus also influenced why the north has become “more Kanak” 
than the south.
There is power in social imaginaries that bind sectors of populations 
together and incorporate ideas of how matters ought to be and what 
should be considered “development” (Chaloping-March 2014). Develop-
ment through mining is an effective narrative by which mining in many 
parts of the world is legitimated because it powerfully incorporates prom-
ise for the future (Golub 2014). As noted by Anna Tsing, the presence 
of valuable minerals in peripheral regions evokes both the imagination 
of international investors and national visions of miraculous futures; she 
added, however, that in the regional creation of frontier mining areas 
where extraction occurs, local places and knowledges become invisible 
(Tsing 2000). The mining “spectacle” and its development narrative thus 
hide locally important ways of knowing and seeing land, and yet alterna-
tive futures beyond mining may be hard to imagine. Kowasch noted how 
the mining industry has transformed Kanak territorial perceptions in that 
they increasingly make claims about their customary lands in environmen-
talist terms; furthermore, the presence of sacred clan sites in Koniambo’s 
exploitation areas may give rise to active resistance by some clans, while 
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others may abandon the sites in favor of financial benefits from the mining 
company (2012, 217). On the other hand, new but contradicting forms 
of resistance, alliance, and argumentation have emerged in the south with 
the establishment of the environmental organization l’Oeil and the recent 
addition of the lagoon to the unesco world heritage list, as tourism, the 
marine environment’s significance for the province, and even the lagoon’s 
global importance have gained more attention (Levacher 2015). Mean-
while, as Horowitz has recently observed (2016), unesco’s large-scale 
conservation measures have even caused difficulties for those in the local 
mining resistance movement, as they have not been provided with the sup-
port they had anticipated.
Willingness to give up the past in exchange for expectations of future 
development—or, possibly, recognition—has been observed in Papua New 
Guinea in particular (West 2006a, 2006b; Robbins 2006; Golub 2014). In 
Paige West’s description, for example, the Gimi are willing to relinquish 
their customs and enter a new world of individual property rights in their 
relations with people from institutions concerned with wildlife manage-
ment and biodiversity conservation (2006a). They are not, however, will-
ing to give up their “Giminess” in terms of measuring everything through 
reciprocity. What follows is that the Gimi are not seeing their expecta-
tions of development fulfilled in exchange for their friendship, land, labor, 
and food. They are not getting benefits from a form of development that 
for the conservationists means inculcating the Gimi into valuing the bio-
diversity of their environment as an economic resource. The overriding 
response on both sides is one of disappointment because the aspirations 
that the project entails for the groups involved do not match. Mining 
and large, environment-changing capitalist projects shape local ideas of 
“development” and expectations concerning the future, with modernity 
producing contradictory responses (West 2006b). For the Gimi, for exam-
ple, two alternative futures could be envisaged: either the transformation 
of their home territory through mining development or the integration of 
their village into environmental conservation goals and the sustainable 
commodity market via ecotourism and handicrafts. Both of these futures 
incorporate expectations of the projects bringing long-term social rela-
tions that in turn would mean access to “development” and benefits for 
all people equally. Either the mine or the conservation area is inevitable 
because the alternative would be that the Gimi would be left on the other 
side of development. Yet, as one Gimi man observed to West on the sub-
ject of the Porgera mine: “But what if you are not one of the people that 
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get a job or a nice house?” (2006b, 306). This strongly resonates with 
the terms in which one of my informants addressed the issue of the devel-
opment impact of vnc: “What is the benefit of the mine for those who 
cultivate land?” The counter-narrative to the development that mining 
brings is provided by people on the margins (West 2006b), people who 
do not get any benefit from the promised improvements but rather wit-
ness downsides like alcoholism, envy, and prostitution—the “breaking of 
social tissue,” as the ccce representative worded it to me. 
Conclusions
Both vnc’s pact of sustainable development and the Koniambo complex 
are anti-politics machines, but in their own way. The outsourcing to min-
ing corporations of the state’s public functions of generating development 
and reducing poverty through territorialization and neoliberal governance 
depoliticizes the larger, historically born inequalities and territorializing 
processes that affect New Caledonia’s Kanak communities. vnc’s pact 
maintains an economic imbalance between Kanak and whites across the 
whole territory and in opposition to trends in the north; it also appropri-
ates political resistance and questions of Kanak territorial relationships 
in favor of the corporate and capitalist model whereby people in their 
relations with the corporation are naturalized as “stakeholders.” At the 
same time, the French state benefits from the fact that the pact is between 
the corporation and the communities, thereby delimiting the state’s social 
responsibilities. Meanwhile the communities are themselves responsible 
for the surveillance of the refinery’s environmental and social impact, 
although when problems occur, there is not much that can be done since 
it is impossible to resist the refinery outside of the pact’s structures. There 
is no room to bring to table the question of whether the refinery should 
even exist, given that it seems to strengthen French and white elite political 
and economic power in the region and to represent a possible hindrance to 
Kanak self-determination.
In the case of the Koniambo complex, sovereignty is advanced but 
development is limited to the social and economic growth that the min-
ing industry can offer. Koniambo’s development narrative is so powerful 
that it overshadows other questions such as who really benefits from the 
factory, whether it advances independence from France, and its long-term 
social and environmental impacts. Furthermore, the narrative of economic 
development and Kanak independence attached to Koniambo makes it 
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difficult to think about the future in terms other than mining and other 
than capitalist types of land relations. Meanwhile, we are still waiting 
for Koniambo to show its real impact on society, to see whether it will 
produce change, reduce inequality, and give way to other types of eman-
cipating projects as well. Nevertheless, in the light of the world’s growing 
mineral demands, it is increasingly important to question and understand 
the complex historical and social circumstances and contrasting trajecto-
ries through which materials so fundamentally important to the capitalist 
world are extracted, refined, and enter global market systems.
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Abstract
In New Caledonia, where a referendum deciding on independence will be held 
by 2018, processes of state territorialization and neoliberalization have led to 
an economic and social imbalance between the poorer, largely Kanak-populated 
North Province and the wealthier, mostly European-populated South Province. 
As a result of historically and clearly articulated definitions of a coherent indig-
enous Kanak identity, however, the Kanak independence movement has been 
able to tie its sovereignty expectations to the development of the mining industry 
in the north. I argue that unequal processes of state territorialization and the 
neoliberal, decolonizing state have influenced the outcomes of the local mining 
industry, resulting in different expectations for the future in the two regions. In 
the North, the Koniambo nickel project is advancing Kanak sovereignty develop-
ment, while, in the south, Vale’s mining project and its pact of corporate social 
responsibility and social development with the southern Kanak communities is 
indirectly strengthening French power as well as co-opting Kanak protests. This 
essay reviews how both mining projects work as what James Ferguson has called 
the “anti-politics machine” of development, hiding the roots of the inequality and 
poverty experienced by people aspiring to recognition and freedom and leaving 
little space for alternative imaginaries of future (1994).
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